Learn about the highlights of the Supreme Court's recent report on caste by the Center for Research and Planning.
New Delhi: The Center for Research and Planning (CRP), the research arm of the Supreme Court, has released a landmark and comprehensive report on the caste system, the judiciary’s language and thinking toward Dalits and backward classes. The report presents an in-depth analysis of significant Supreme Court judgments delivered by Constitutional Benches consisting of five or more judges. Titled “Judicial Conceptions of Caste,” the report was released three days ago and its primary objective is to sensitize judges, legal researchers, policymakers, and the general public on the issue of caste and to promote the use of inclusive and dignified language.
Published in November 2025, this report focuses on decisions of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, covering matters related to affirmative action, personal law, and atrocities. The report is authored by Dr. Anurag Bhaskar (CRP Director), Dr. Farah Ahmed (Professor at Melbourne Law School), Bheemraj Muthu (Doctoral Researcher at Oxford University), and Shubham Kumar (CRP Consultant). The report aims to sensitize the judiciary, legal scholars, policymakers, and civil society about judicial language related to caste, in order to promote inclusive discourse consistent with constitutional values.
The report reveals that earlier decisions used terms like “handicap” and “crutch” to describe the Dalit community and even compared them to animals. The 1964 T. Devadasan case used the metaphors of “race horse” and “ordinary horse” to explain reservations. The 1992 Indira Sawhney case described reservations as “a career-long crutch.” These terms are not considered in keeping with constitutional dignity. However, the report also points out that the judiciary’s language has improved over time. Newer judgments acknowledge historical discrimination while emphasizing the rights and dignity of Dalits.
The report is divided into three major sections. The first section, “Judicial Discourse on the Caste System,” focuses on judicial discourse on the caste system. It covers subtopics such as the varna system, the relationship between caste and occupation, concepts of the sacred and the profane, the supposedly “auspicious” origins of the caste system, the view of caste as an association, and the presence of caste in various religions. The report finds a clear confusion in the court’s understanding of caste.
Some judgments have accepted caste as a rigid, hereditary hierarchy based on notions of purity and pollution. On the other hand, some judgments have portrayed it as primarily a benign occupational system or an autonomous group. These divergent perspectives highlight an unresolved tension between sociological realities and the concept of caste as described in religious texts.
The report also cites Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy’s statement that Dalits and backward classes “need assistance, facilities, launches… their needs are their demands. Demands are for rights, not charity.”
Convergent Views on Caste in Non-Hindu Religions
According to the report, there is a fundamental tension in the judiciary’s understanding of caste: some consider it a religious construct limited to Hinduism, while others recognize it as a social institution that transcends religious boundaries. Justice Kuldip Singh’s minority judgment in the Indira Sawhney case traced caste’s origins to Hinduism, calling it “sui generis” for Hindu orthodoxy, and cited the Rig Veda and Manusmriti as its foundational texts.
In contrast, Justice Chinnappa Reddy, Justice Ratnavel Pandian, and Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan took a different approach. They recognized that while caste may have originated in Hindu religious ideology, it has long since transcended its religious origins to become a widespread form of socio-economic organization in non-Hindu religions as well. They documented how caste-like hierarchical systems exist among Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs, manifesting through occupational and regional groups.
Changes in judicial language toward the Dalit community
The second major section of the report, “Judicial Discourse on Oppressed Class People,” focuses on judicial language regarding Dalits and oppressed caste people. This section highlights how judicial language has oscillated between metaphors and descriptions affirming the dignity of Dalit communities and stigmatizing them. Previous judgments have used terms like “handicap” or “crutch” to describe Dalits, and even compared them to animals.
For example, in the T. Devadasan case (1964), Justice K. Subba Rao used the metaphors of “racehorse” and “ordinary horse” to explain reservation. In the Indira Sawhney case (1992), Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy called reservation “a career-long crutch.” According to the report, such language is inconsistent with constitutional dignity and reflects a perspective of individual deficiency rather than structural inequality.
However, the report also acknowledges that over time, the Court has distanced itself from such language and has adopted statements recognizing historical discrimination, the socially constructed nature of merit, and the constitutional demand to eliminate caste prejudice. The report also cites Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy’s statement that Dalits and backward classes “need assistance, they need facilities, they need launching… their needs are their demands. Demands are those of right, not charity.”
Early judgments such as State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951) and T. Devadasan (1964) criticized reservation as discrimination against “meritorious” candidates and a threat to efficiency. However, in later judgments, such as N.M. Thomas (1976) and Indira Sawhney (1992), the Court viewed reservation as a means of constitutional repair and a means of increasing power sharing.
Questions on Merit and Efficiency
According to the report, judicial decisions questioned the “merit” and “competence” of Dalits and described reservation as a threat to administrative efficiency. In the M.R. Balaji case (1963), the court stated that reservation “is bound to lead to some lowering of standards.”
In the N.M. Thomas case (1976), Justice H.R. Khanna warned that reservation would be “clearly detrimental to the ideals of supremacy of merit and efficiency of services.” In the same case, Chief Justice A.N. Ray stated that “efficiency of administration is so paramount that any reservation at the expense of efficiency would be unwise and impermissible.”
The report rejects these arguments, stating that such language portrays historically disadvantaged communities as weak rather than competent. However, the court changed this view in subsequent decisions. In the Indira Sawhney case, Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy acknowledged that “it is undeniable that nature has endowed members of the backward classes with the same abilities as members of other classes; all that is needed is an opportunity to prove it.”
Judicial Discourse on Remedying Caste-Based Injustice
The third major section of the report, “Judicial Discourse on Remedying Caste-Based Injustice,” is devoted to judicial discourse on resolving caste-based injustice. This includes the court’s opinions on solutions such as education, reservation, poverty, and socio-economic development. The report notes that some judgments have stated that caste can be eradicated through education. In the Ashok Kumar Thakur case (2008), Justice Dalveer Bhandari said, “The first place where caste can be eradicated is class… In other words, if you belong to a lower caste but have good abilities, hardly anyone will care about your caste.” But the report calls this approach idealistic but inadequate, as it ignores evidence of the continued presence of caste bias within educational institutions and public services.
The judiciary’s stance on reservation has changed over time. Early judgments, such as State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951) and T. Devadasan (1964), described reservation as discrimination against “meritorious” candidates and a threat to efficiency. However, in later judgments, such as N.M. Thomas (1976) and Indira Sawhney (1992), the Court viewed reservation as a means of constitutional reform and a means of increasing participation in power.
An important point highlighted in the report is that some judgments cited poverty, not caste, as the primary cause of backwardness. In M.R. Balaji (1963), the Court stated that “social backwardness is, in the final analysis, largely the result of poverty.” In K.C. Vasanthi Kumar (1985), Justice D.A. Desai stated that “a time has come when economic backwardness is the sole criterion for identifying socially and educationally backward classes, ignoring the caste label.” The report calls these claims inconsistent with sociological facts and states that caste discrimination and social exclusion persist even when economic conditions have improved.
In its conclusion, the report demonstrates that the judiciary’s discourse on caste has not been uniform or static; rather, it has undergone numerous changes and incorporated diverse perspectives. The report recommends that future judicial decisions should use language that is more sensitive, historically informed, and consistent with constitutional values when addressing caste. A thoughtful and reflective approach will enable the judiciary to develop a more nuanced understanding of caste, recognize structural disadvantage without resorting to deficit-based narratives, and affirm the agency and dignity of oppressed communities.
By adopting language that affirms dignity, recognizes structural injustice, and supports inclusive development, the court can further strengthen the Constitution’s transformative project and contribute to a more just and equitable society. The report’s acknowledgements section cites the University of Melbourne’s collaboration with former Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Secretary General Shekhar C. Mungte.
Summary
The report examined Constitution Bench decisions from 1950 to 2025, dealing with issues such as affirmative action, caste-based atrocity laws, and the interpretation of caste in personal laws. The report’s purpose is not to criticize any individual judge, but to analyze the debate in its constitutional and social context.
Geetha Sunil Pillai
Courtesy: Hindi News