BSP’s Internal Crisis Looms Large over the Future of Dalit Politics in UP

BSP’s Internal Crisis Looms Large over the Future of Dalit Politics in UP

An Ambedkarite joining any party other than BSP was once an anomaly in UP but not anymore, writes Sumeet Samos.

For many years, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) has primarily been discussed in the media around three key points: can it revive the electoral fortunes it lost in 2012? What are its plans for forming an electoral alliance with opposition parties? And what role will Akash Anand play in steering a declining party that, in 2007, came to power independently in India’s most populous state?

These discussions are typical in electoral politics and media, with political commentators, party supporters, and critics often engaging with these topics. Parties such as Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)), Samajwadi Party (SP), Shiv Sena, Lok Janshakti Party (LJP), and Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) have also faced questions about succession, electoral alliances, and strategies for revival following recent defeats and internal divisions.

However, what is peculiar about the BSP in this case is that its predicaments and internal turmoil have been lingering for years now, with no satisfying response to even its cadres, supporters, and sympathisers.

    When internal turmoil, indifference from the leadership, and confusion among supporters become symbolic of a party rather than its ability to win and revive, it inevitably impacts both its voter base and political workers.

For a party like the BSP, which consolidated a significant section of Dalits in Uttar Pradesh to become an autonomous political constituency to contend for state power and ideologically politicised them as Ambedkarites, its lingering predicaments have wider implications for the force of Dalits as an autonomous political constituency.

Its internal turmoil is further exacerbated by external competitors like the SP, Congress, and the Akhil Bharat Dalit Mahasabha (ASP), which are vying for its constituency, including both voters and political workers.

After every successive decline of the BSP’s vote share in the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections, the party has put forward the arguments that other social groups, such as Muslims and Other Backward Classes (OBCs), did not vote for them and that the Congress and SP had manipulated its constituency, despite not being their well-wishers.

At the same time, some of its strong loyalists argue that the BSP is a mission and an Ambedkarite movement that they would always stand behind, regardless of its electoral standing. There are also those within the BSP who blame Satish Mishra and his lobby for influencing BSP supremo Mayawati and getting their way to the party’s detriment.

    Leaders who leave the party are often blamed for not being committed to the Ambedkarite movement and for being opportunists.

One of the most significant events in this context was the emergence of Chandrashekhar Azad and the Bhim Army in 2017 during the Saharanpur caste violence, widely covered by the mainstream media as a new contender for Dalit politics in Uttar Pradesh.

However, Azad’s style of street politics and direct agitation against authorities is often criticised as emotional and detrimental to Dalit youth, who may later face harassment from the police. Later when Azad decided to get into electoral politics by forming ASP, it was seen by BSP either as a negligible force or a formation propped up by the opposition parties to divide the Dalits.

There is some truth to certain claims, but they are also accompanied by conspiracy theories, passive submission, and a reluctance to offer a substantial critique of the party’s internal workings, narrative-building efforts, and the high-handed decision-making process of its leadership. This became particularly evident when Akash Anand was recently ousted from the party by BSP chief Mayawati.

Unlike Tejaswi Yadav, who gradually took over the RJD, or even the likes of Aditya Thackeray and Udayanidhi Stalin, who are seen to be on the path of gradual ascendance, Akash Anand’s political journey has been a confusing one under the shadow of the BSP chief. He is repeatedly ousted and reinstated, and to make matters worse, he is publicly reprimanded for immaturity, with much focus on his family’s role.

    There is little deliberation among the party intellectuals about how damaging this is to the party’s image and its current standing. Instead, Akash Anand’s quiet acceptance is lauded as an act of a committed soldier of the Bahujan movement, and it must have been a well-thought-out decision by the top leadership.

This particular view submerges the disillusionment of a section of Ambedkarite Dalit youths who had started to see Akash Anand as their representative for reviving the party and getting more youth into the fold.

The ultimate response of the party intellectuals to the lingering internal turmoil then boils down to the usual ‘Silent Wisdom’ of the top leadership that the masses and party supporters cannot comprehend now. There is also an invocation of BSP’s early history and legacy to sideline any critique for it to revive in the present.

Dalits as a Political Question and a Political Constituency

In the run-up to the 2024 general elections, the caste census became one of the political debating points, started by Tejaswi and Nitish Kumar and later taken up by Rahul Gandhi. It seemed like there was a possibility of Mandal 2.0, where OBCs in UP and Bihar could be consolidated behind the opposition alliance.

This did not materialise directly due to the Extremely Backward Classes (EBC) constituency that the BJP has cultivated over the years, along with the presence of several OBC parties based on individual castes or small caste clusters. Bihar’s Lok Sabha results reflected this, while in Uttar Pradesh, the better ticket distribution of SP among different sections of OBCs was credited with giving it the victory it garnered.

    At the same time, it should be noted that the Dalit political question became the most sensitive narrative that could sway voters easily.

By the “Dalit political question,” I am referring to the figure of Dr Ambedkar, the Constitution, and reservation—topics that Ambedkarite parties have nurtured through rhetoric, iconography, symbolism, and mobilisations over the past several decades.

The Constitution and reservation have also become central to a section of politicised OBC groups. As a result, the narrative of a threat to the Constitution and reservation appears to have influenced a portion of Dalit and OBC voters, swaying them toward SP and Congress in the Uttar Pradesh Lok Sabha elections.

Furthermore, Dr Ambedkar as a figure is being discussed in popular politics far more than ever before, from building grand statues to debating in Parliament about the tone in which his name should be uttered. However, these political churnings and debates are taking place with parties like the BSP on the periphery, which has a history of an Ambedkarite legacy to popularise the figure of Ambedkar, the topic of reservation, and the symbol of the Constitution.

The BSP’s critique of SP and Congress is that these parties were essentially the same as the BJP and lacked genuine commitment to the Constitution, Ambedkar, and reservation. The criticism focused more on their intentions rather than offering a strong narrative that could showcase its political strength and ability to win elections.

More importantly, this critique is a lot more valid when it comes to the composition of the Congress and the BJP, but there are many differences in what the parties want to achieve, their organisational strengths, and their visions for the country.

    Harping on political correctness and ideological rigidity, one should not forget where there are possibilities to negotiate and who constitutes the real enemy. This criticism of the BJP and Congress as similar could serve as an electoral strategy when no party held a dominant position, the winning threshold was below 40 percent, and the formation of coalitions was necessary.

Now, times have changed. Since 2017, the BJP has become the dominant force in assembly elections, while the Samajwadi Party could no longer rely solely on its Yadav-Muslim alliance. To stay relevant, SP had to reach out to sections of Dalits, further complicating the electoral dynamics.

Ideological affiliations do not always align with voters’ preferences; practical considerations also play a significant role in shaping their allegiances, even if only for a short time.

    The issue with the BSP is that in electoral politics, it continues to seek the allegiance of its Dalit supporters based on the ideological morality of a social movement while trying to practically negotiate with other social groups. This approach prevents it from addressing the practical concerns of a section of its core supporters, who have begun to realise that other contenders are better positioned to either challenge the BJP or win the elections.

    The internal turmoil and decline of the BSP are a significant blow to the Dalit political constituency in Uttar Pradesh. Being an Ambedkarite and joining another party in UP is no longer seen as an anomaly as it once was.

Given the repeated emphasis on Satta (state power) in BSP’s political socialisation, its political workers are conditioned to desire to be in state power or stay close to those engaging with it. Parties like SP, ASP, and Congress, having realised this crisis in the BSP, are eager to absorb the political workers of BSP, which they have already started doing, and also utilise the rhetoric that the BSP used to speak.

But at the same time, with different OBC castes and their interest groups in SP, and a history of tensions between Yadavs and Chamars, how far can claims of disgruntled Dalits as a political constituency be recognised and given space? Or was the shift of votes just an electoral necessity for both sides?

The ASP, on the other hand, is organisationally weak and works solely around the charisma of Azad. Can the ASP do the secondary conversion of disgruntled BSP political workers, in tune with its brand of politics, to create a new political constituency in the long run? How effective can a Dalit political constituency be in advancing their political questions without the support of their parties?

Dalits have historically mobilised around three A’s: Ambedkar, Affirmative Action, and Atrocities, regardless of the backing or leading by political parties. However, without a strong social movement, bureaucratic intervention, and a political party, their questions are not sustained in the long term.

In states such as Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Gujarat, and Rajasthan, where Dalit civil societies and political organisations are weak, even making Dalits a part of the news is difficult, whereas in states such as Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, which have witnessed the opposite, sustaining themselves and expanding the horizon of their questions has been the biggest challenge.

    The BSP, originally envisioned by Kanshi Ram a a platform for aspirational national politics among sections of Dalits, is now in deep crisis. Many of its political workers are in a political vacuum or have been trying to find their space elsewhere.

The reluctance of the party’s top leadership to empower second-rung leaders from other states has hindered its expansion, a challenge further compounded by the hegemony of locally dominant castes in regional parties and the Congress who are seen to be in an advantaged position and in power to negotiate Dalit claims.

Moreover, the rise of the BJP as the dominant party in Uttar Pradesh has strengthened the social power of castes like Thakurs and Jats, with Dalits often bearing the brunt of it. Many also view the national BJP’s political rhetoric, power, and actions with apprehension and fear, underscoring the urgent need for a broader political alliance. The decline of the BSP poses an existential crisis for Dalit political mobilisation, in UP and beyond.

Courtesy: The Quint

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